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6.1 Introduction
In the late nineteenth century, at the same time that transport and com-
munication costs were declining across the world, there occurred what has re-
cently been dubbed by Ken Pomeranz “The Great Divergence” (2000). Per
capita incomes across the world seemingly diverged by much more in 1910
than in 1800, and more in 1990 than in 1910—this despite the voluminous lit-
erature on exogenous growth that has stressed the convergence of economies,
or, to be more precise, “conditional” convergence. The convergence doctrine
holds that economies that are below their steady state should grow more
quickly as they converge to the steady state. This approach allows for diﬀer-
ences in the steady-state level of per capita income, but its emphasis on con-
vergence has hidden the fact that there has been divergencein the absolute lev-
els of income per capita. This has been recently emphasized by Easterly and
Levine (2000), who further argue that the divergence of incomes is better ex-
plained by appealing to technology diﬀerences than by factor accumulation.
In this paper, we examine the changes in per capita income and produc-
tivity from 1800 to modern times, and show four things:
1. There has been increasing inequality in incomes per capita across
countries since 1800 despite substantial improvements in the mobility of
goods, capital, and technology.
2. The source of this divergence was increasing diﬀerences in the eﬃ-
ciency or total factor productivity (TFP) of economies.
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ciate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.3. These diﬀerences in eﬃciency were not due to the inability of poor
countries to get access to the new technologies of the Industrial Revolution.
Instead, diﬀerences in the eﬃciency of useof new technologies explain both
low levels of income in poor countries and the slow adoption of Western
technology.
4. The pattern of trade from the late nineteenth century between the
poor and the rich economies should in principle reveal whether the problem
of the poor economies was peculiarly a problem of employing labor eﬀec-
tively.
Results for the ﬁrst two observations are described in section 6.2, and
these are quite consistent with the results of Pomeranz (2000) and of East-
erly and Levine (2000). The third observation—that the poor countries had
accessto new technologies—is dealt with in section 6.3. We show that at the
same time that incomes were diverging, the ease of technological transmis-
sion between countries was increasing because of improvements in trans-
portation, and political and organizational changes. By the late nineteenth
century poor countries had access to the same repertoire of equipment,
generally imported from the United Kingdom, as the rich. The problem, as
we demonstrate in section 6.4 for the case of railways, was ineﬃciency in the
useof this new technology in poor countries, even when the direction, plan-
ning, and supervision were done by Western experts. Thus, the world was
diverging in an era of ever more rapid communication and cheaper trans-
portation, mainly because of mysterious diﬀerences in the eﬃciency of use
of technology across countries.
In the last sections of the paper we develop an analytical method that in
principle should allow us to say more about the source of these production
ineﬃciencies in poor countries, an area where economists have made little
progress. Some have argued that the key is poor management in the low-
income countries, and an inability to absorb best-practice technology from
the advanced economies because of low levels of education, externalities, or
learning by doing. There is just a generalized ineﬃciency in poor countries.
But others, including one of the authors (Clark 1987; Wolcott and Clark
1999), have argued that the problem lies in the poor performance of pro-
duction workers in low-wage countries and not in management, which in
much of the world in the late nineteenth century was relatively easily im-
ported. For ease of reference we call the ﬁrst hypothesis on eﬃciency diﬀer-
ences generalized ineﬃciencies.The second we refer to as labor ineﬃciencies,
or, more generally, factor-speciﬁc ineﬃciencies.
Testing which of these possible explanations is correct is not easy. With-
out knowledge of the parameters of the production function for each in-
dustry, how can we say whether the observed ineﬃciency of the poorer
countries stemmed from labor problems or from generalized ineﬃciencies?
Here we make use of results from international trade theory, in particular
278 Gregory Clark and Robert C. FeenstraTreﬂer (1993, 1995), to test whether the eﬃciency diﬀerences across coun-
tries circa 1910 were of the generalized sort that could come from manage-
ment or technology absorption problems, as opposed to speciﬁc problems
in the use of labor. Under this approach we make use of the observed trade
patterns of countries to infer the underlying productivities of factors.
Some evidence on the patterns of trade, in historical and modern times,
is summarized in section 6.5. We show, for example, that India, at least as
of 1910, was a net exporter of land-intensive commodities, which is quite
puzzling. This fact can perhaps be explained, however, if its eﬃciency of
land exceeded that of labor. We show in section 6.6 that the factor-content
equations from the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) model allow us to place
some bounds on the relative eﬃciency of factors across countries, so that
the trade data can be reconciled. In section 6.7 we explore this issue empir-
ically using the sign pattern of trade, circa 1910 and 1990. Conclusions and
directions for further research are given in section 6.8.
6.2 Incomes Per Capita
As noted above, recent research by Pomeranz and others suggests that in
1800 diﬀerences in income per capita were modest around the world. In
part this result is unsurprising. In a Malthusian world of slow technologi-
cal advance, living standards themselves reveal nothing about an economy’s
level of technology or its direction. Thus, the Europeans who visited Tahiti
in the eighteenth century were astonished by two things (in addition to the
islands’ sexual mores)—the stone-age technology of the inhabitants, who so
prized iron that they would trade a pig for one nail, and the ease and abun-
dance in which they were living. But that abundance was purchased by a
high rate of infanticide, which ensured a small number of surviving children
per couple and consequently good material conditions. Tahiti was not a
candidate for an industrial revolution, no matter how well fed its inhabi-
tants.
The claim for the sophistication of Chinese and Japanese technology in
the eighteenth century lies more properly with their ability to maintain
more people per square mile at a high living standard than any European
economy could. The low level of Tahitian technology in the late eighteenth
century is evident in Tahiti’s capacity to support only 14 people per square
mile as opposed to England’s 166.1 Japan was supporting about 226 people
per square mile from 1721 to 1846, and the coastal regions of China also at-
tained even higher population densities: in 1787 Jiangsu had an incredible
875 people per square mile. It may be objected that these densities were
based on paddy rice cultivation, an option not open to most of Europe. But
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1. These population ﬁgures for Tahiti come from the years 1800 to 1820, when there may al-
ready have been some population losses from contact with Europeans. See Oliver (1974).even in the wheat regions of Shantung and Hopei, Chinese population den-
sities in 1787 were more than double those of England and France. China
had pushed preindustrial organic technology much further by 1800 than
anywhere in Europe. The West was clearly behind.
Yet by 1910 the situation had reversed itself, and incomes per capita be-
gan to diverge sharply between an advanced group of economies and an un-
derdeveloped world whose most important members were India and China.
Figure 6.1 portrays this divergence, showing income per capita in the
United States, Japan, Europe, Russia, and China relative to India in 1700,
1820, 1910, 1952, 1978, and 1992. Table 6.1 shows the income per capita of
a variety of countries relative to India in 1910, using in part new data as-
sembled by Prados de la Escosura (2000). Income relative to India from the
Penn World Tables in 1990 is also shown. In 1910 India and China seem to
have been the poorest countries in the world, and income per capita varied
by a factor of about 9 to 1 around the world. By 1990 the income in some
sub-Saharan Africa countries was no higher than in India in 1910, and in-
comes per capita by then varied by a factor of about 30 to 1 around the
world.
Why did income per capita decline in poor countries such as India and
China relative to the advanced economies such as the United States since
1800? We argue that the overwhelming cause was a decline in the eﬃciency
of utilization of technology in these countries relative to the more success-
ful economies such as those of Great Britain and the United States. Con-
ventional estimates report that about one-third of the diﬀerence in incomes
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Fig. 6.1 Incomes per capita relative to India
Sources: 1700, 1820, Maddison (1989); 1910, Prados de la Escosura (2000) and Maddison
(1989); 1952, 1978, and 1992, Penn World Tables.per capita between countries comes from capital (conventionally mea-
sured), and the rest from eﬃciency (TFP) diﬀerences.2But this assumes that
diﬀerences in capital per worker across countries, which are very highly cor-
related with diﬀerences in income per capita and measured TFP since
World War II, were exogenous. In a world where capital can ﬂow between
economies, capital/worker should be regarded as an endogenous variable,
and it would itself respond to diﬀerences in the country productivity levels.
6.2.1 Perfect Capital Mobility
As a ﬁrst approximation, we believe that the rental cost of capital was
eﬀectively equalized across rich and poor countries by international capital
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Table 6.1 Income Per Capita, 1910 and 1990




1910 1990   0.33,   0   0.33,   0.1   0.50,   0
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
United States 9.4 14.3 3.9 4.4 2.7
Australia 9.2 11.4 2.9 3.5 2.1
Canada 9.1 13.6 3.6 3.8 2.3
Great Britain 8.0 10.5 4.4 3.8 2.5
New Zealand 7.9 8.9 3.1 — —
Argentina 7.6 3.7 4.0 2.3 1.7
France 7.2 11.0 3.9 3.6 2.2
Germany 7.0 11.6 4.2 3.4 2.1
Sweden 6.0 11.7 3.6 3.3 2.0
Italy 4.9 9.9 3.1 3.8 2.4
Spain 4.8 7.6 2.8 3.4 2.2
Ireland 4.8 7.5 2.9 — —
Finland 4.6 11.1 2.8 3.0 1.7
Russia 4.2 — 2.2 — —
Portugal 3.7 5.9 2.5 2.8 2.1
Japan 3.5 11.3 2.8 2.7 1.6
Ottoman Empire 3.3 3.0 2.0 — —
The Philippines 2.4 1.3 1.8 — —
Thailand 1.6 2.8 1.3 1.5 1.3
Korea 1.5 5.3 1.5 2.4 1.6
Indonesia 1.3 1.6 1.2 — —
China — 1.0 — — —
Zimbabwe — 0.9 — 0.6 0.5
Zambia — 0.5 — 0.7 0.8
Sources: Prados de la Escosura (2000); Penn World Tables (PWT 5.6).
Notes: TFP in column (3) is computed assuming full capital mobility between countries, according to
equation (5). TFP in columns (4) and (5) is computed from equation (1 ). Dashes indicate data are not
available.
2. See, for example, Easterly and Levine (2000).282 Gregory Clark and Robert C. Feenstra
Fig. 6.2 Government bond returns, 1900–1914
Sources: Table 6.1. India and New Zealand: Edelstein (1982). Great Britain, Ireland, United
States, France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Canada, Italy, and Switzerland: Homer
and Sylla (1996). Argentina, Egypt, Japan, Russia, Sweden, Portugal, and Australia (sterling
bonds in London): Mauro, Sussman, and Yafeh (2001).
Notes: Output per person is measured as an index with India set equal to 1. For the United
States, municipal bonds yields were used. Egyptian income per person was asumed the same
as the Ottoman Empire. Irish returns were assumed the same as British returns. Indian and
New Zealand returns are from 1870–1913. The symbols used are as follows: Au (Australia),
Ar (Argentina), Be (Belgium), Ca (Canada), Eg (Egypt), Fr (France), Ge (Germany), GB
(Great Britain), I (India), Ir (Ireland), It (Italy), Ja (Japan), Ne (the Netherlands), NZ (New
Zealand), Po (Portugal), Ru (Russia), Sw (Sweden), Sz (Switzerland), and US (United States
of America).
movements by the late nineteenth century. Figure 6.2, for example, shows
rates of return on government bonds in nineteen countries at a variety of in-
come levels in 1900–1914 as a function of the relative level of output per
capita in each country in 1910. There was variation in the rates of return on
these various government bonds in the range of about 2 to 1. But, impor-
tantly, this variation had little correlation with the income level of the coun-
try. Indeed, if we regress government bond rates in 1900–1914 on output per
capita though the slope coeﬃcient is negative it is statistically insigniﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent from zero: Rates of return on government bonds seem un-
correlated with income.
We can also get rates of return on private borrowing by looking at returns
on railway debentures. Railways were the biggest private borrowers in the
international capital markets in the late nineteenth century, and their capi-
tal needs were so great that if they were able to borrow at international ratesof return it would help equalize rates of return across all assets in domestic
capital markets. Table 6.2 shows the realized rates of return earned by in-
vestors in railway debentures in the London capital market between 1870
and 1913. Again, there are variations across countries. But, importantly for
our purposes, this variation shows no correlation with output per person.
Indeed, India, one of the poorest economies in the world, had among the
lowest railway interest costs because the Indian government guaranteed the
bonds of the railways as a way of promoting infrastructure investment. This
rough equalization of returns to poor and rich countries was achieved by
signiﬁcant capital ﬂows into these countries. By 1914 Egypt, the Ottoman
Empire, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Peru had all attracted at least £10
per head of foreign investment (Pamuk 1987).
In a world of rapid capital mobility, how should we calculate TFP? Sup-
pose as an approximation that the production function is Cobb-Douglas so
that




where T idenotes land and Aithe eﬃciency (TFP) of country i. Choose units
so that Ai, Ki, Y i, and T i are 1 in India. Taking capital stocks as exogenous,
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The rental on capital can be computed by diﬀerentiating equation (1). Tak-
ing this derivative and assuming the same rental on capital in all countries,
then capital per worker in country i relative to India would be3
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Table 6.2 Rates of Return on Railway Debentures, 1870–1913
Relative Output Per Capita Rate of Return
Country or Region (India   1) (%)
United States 9.4 6.03
Canada 9.1 4.99
United Kingdom 7.9 3.74
Argentina 7.6 5.13
Brazil — 5.10
Western Europe 6.1 5.28
Eastern Europe 4.1 5.33
British India 1.0 3.65
Source: Table 1 in Edelstein (1982, 125).
Note: Dash indicates data are not available.
3. The derivative of equation (1) with respect to Ki can be expressed as Ri    Ai(Ki/
Li)( –1)(T i/Li) . Dividing this entire expression by the same equation for India, which is as-
sumed to have the same rental Ri, we therefore obtain 1   Ai(Ki/Li)( –1)(T i/Li) , where all vari-
ables are now expressed relative to India. Then equation (3) follows directly.(3)  
K
Li
i     Ai





  (1  )
.
The amount of capital employed would thus depend on the level of eﬃ-
ciency of the economy. The more eﬃcient an economy, the more capital it
would attract, which would have a second round eﬀect in increasing income
per person. Substituting equation (3) into equation (2), we obtain the fol-










  (1  )
.
Notice that the right-hand sides of equations (3) and (4) are identical, so
that capital/worker and output/worker are equal with capital endogenous
and rates of return equalized across countries. It follows from equation (4)
that we can calculate relative eﬃciencies in the world economy circa 1910
as












Thus, in this case we can calculate relative TFP for each country relative to
India from just the relative outputs per capita and the relative amount of
land per person. Since the share of land in national income,  , has become
very small in recent years, equation (4) suggests that the sole signiﬁcant
cause of diﬀerences in income per capita between India and the United
States and other advanced economies is diﬀerences in TFP.
6.2.2 Evidence from 1910
Even without reliable data on capital stocks across countries, we can cal-
culate TFP from equation (5) if there is mobile capital. Column (3) of table
6.1 and ﬁgure 6.3 show the implied TFP of the various countries in the
world in 1910 for which we have data, relative to India, assuming the share
of capital in national income was 0.33 and that of land was 0.1. Diﬀerences
in the land endowment per person were great enough that even assuming
land had only a 10 percent share in output we seem to be overcorrecting for
the eﬀect of land on income per capita. Thus there is no reason to believe
that the eﬃciency of the U.S., Canadian, or Australian economies was re-
ally below that of Great Britain in 1910. What we also see is that in a world
of free-ﬂowing capital, modest diﬀerences in the eﬃciencies of economies
get translated into much bigger diﬀerences in income, through generation
of additional savings by higher income and the movement of capital to the
high-eﬃciency areas.
The assumption that capital invested was constant per unit of gross do-
mestic product (GDP) might be regarded as unreasonable for 1910. Perhaps
then capital was not so mobile as now, so that poorer economies typically
284 Gregory Clark and Robert C. Feenstrahad smaller stocks of capital relative to output and higher returns on capi-
tal. This proposition is diﬃcult to test, but one partial measure is aﬀorded
by the amount of railway line per unit of GDP observed. Railways were
huge sinks of capital in the late nineteenth century and a popular vehicle for
foreign investment. If capital was really scarce in the poor countries, then
along with other investments the stock of rail line per unit of income should
be smaller the lower the income level per person. Figure 6.4 shows railway
line per unit of income as an index versus GDP per capita for a variety of
countries in 1910. If we were to exclude the low-population-density settler
colonies of North America, Argentina, and Australasia, we would ﬁnd that
poor countries had as many miles of railway line per unit of GDP as rich
countries.
6.2.3 Evidence from 1990
The assumption here that capital will be proportional to output ﬁnds
support in the international economy of the 1990s. Using a sample of coun-
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Fig. 6.3 Calculated diﬀerences in eﬃciency (TFP) circa 1910
Notes: Output per person is measured as an index with India set equal to 1. Eﬃciency is
measured as an index with India again set to 1. The country symbols are as follows: A (Aus-
tria), Au (Australia), Ar (Argentina), Be (Belgium), Bu (Burma), Ca (Canada), De (Den-
mark), Fi (Finland), Fr (France), Ge (Germany), GB (Great Britain), Gr (Greece), Hu
(Hungary), I (India), In (Indonesia), Ir (Ireland), It (Italy), Ja (Japan), Ko (Korea), Ne (the
Netherlands), NZ (New Zealand), OE (Ottoman Empire), Ph (the Philippines), Po (Portu-
gal), Ru (Russia), SL (Sri Lanka), Sp (Spain), Sw (Sweden), Sz (Switzerland), Th (Thailand),
and US (United States).tries including those in table 6.1 for 1990, ﬁgure 6.5shows capita per worker
versus GDP per worker, with both measured relative to India. Recall from
equations (3) and (4) that these should be equal with full capital mobility,
and from ﬁgure 6.4, capital is clearly closely proportional to output. Re-
gressing the log of capital per worker on the log of GDP per capita on all
countries of the Penn World Tables (PWT) for which capital is available for
1990, we ﬁnd








  , N   60, R2   0.85.
(0.11) (0.07)
The coeﬃcient on ln(GDP/worker) is somewhat higher than unity, but still
seems consistent with the hypothesis that capital is roughly proportionate
to output, as implied by full capital mobility with Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion functions across countries.
How important are eﬃciency diﬀerences in explaining income diﬀer-
ences in 1990? For the 1990 data, since land rents are so small a share of in-
come by then, we ignore these. Since PWT does not provide us with data on
the share of national income received by labor and capital, in order to esti-
mate  , we rewrite equation (1) as ln(Y i/Li)   ln Ai   ln(Ki/Li), and
regress real GDP per worker on real capital stock per worker. Running this
regression over all countries and years for which data are available in PWT,
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Fig. 6.4 Railway line per unit of GDP, 1910
Note: Country symbols are as in ﬁgure 6.3.Technology in the Great Divergence 287
Fig. 6.5 Capital per worker versus GDP per worker, 1990
Source: Penn World Tables (5.6).
dard error   0.01). Performing the same regression in ﬁrst diﬀerences,
which still include ﬁxed eﬀects for countries, we obtain   0.34 (s.e.  
0.04). Thus, the interval [0.33, 0.5] gives an adequate range for the share of
national income going to capital, and this is quite consistent with our pri-
ors for the capital share across various countries. In the ﬁnal columns of
table 6.1 we report the calculation of TFP using these values of   and the
formula















   ,
where all variables are measured relative to those in India.
In ﬁgure 6.6, we graph real GDP per capita against TFP, using the inter-
mediate value of   0.4. There is quite clearly a strong positive relationship
between these measures of technology and income for the sample of coun-
tries we have used. We saw above that capital per worker and GDP per
worker are also closely linked. When GDP per capita is regressed against
both these variables for 1990, we obtain
ln(GDP per capita)    0.02   1.06 ln(TFP)   0.43 ln   ,
(0.04) (0.07) (0.03)
N   60, R2   0.96.
capital
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Fig. 6.6 GDP per capita versus TFP, 1990
Source: Penn World Tables (5.6).
From this regression, it appears that both TFP and capital are important
determinants of national income. The relative contributions of each in ex-
plaining GDP per capita can be computed by expressing this regression in
terms of variances:
var(GDP per capita)   1.062 var(TFP)   0.432 var  
  0.91 cov   var(error),
where all variables are expressed in logs, and the covariance is between TFP
and capital/worker. Using the sample values for these variances, we ﬁnd
that TFP explains one-quarter of the variance in GDP per capita, and cap-
ital/worker explains one-third of this variation, but the covariance between
TFP and capital/worker explains nearly 40 percent of this variation! This
reinforces our argument that capital/worker should be regarded as an en-
dogenous variable, itself responding to diﬀerences in the level of productiv-
ity across countries.
We can test for the endogeneity of capital by using equation (3), while ig-
noring land (  0). Running this regression for 1990, we obtain
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Fig. 6.7 TFP calculated with and without capital stock information, 1990
Note: TFP calculated using   0.33.
The implied capital share is   1   (1/1.86)   0.46, which is quite close to
the value   0.4 used to construct TFP in this regression. That is, the hy-
pothesis of perfect capital mobility, with equalization of rentals across
countries, receives some support from the coeﬃcient on ln(TFP) in this re-
gression. However, the fact that the constant term is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero indicates that full capital mobility, with Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion functions across countries, does not appear to hold.
If capital is indeed mobile, then we should really take the regression
above, explaining capital/worker, and substitute this into the previous re-
gression, explaining GDP per capital. In other words, let us treat TFP as the
only underlying determinant of income, and use this to obtain
ln(GDP per capita)   0.21   1.85 ln(TFP), N   60, R2   0.79.
(0.10) (0.13)
According to these estimates, TFP has a magniﬁed impact on income per
capita, with an elasticity of 1.85, via its direct eﬀect and its induced eﬀect
on capital ﬂows. This is exactly what we expect from equation (4).
As a ﬁnal check for 1990, we can compute TFP according to equation (3),
without using data on capital stocks but assuming full capital mobility.
Then, as shown in ﬁgure 6.7, we ﬁnd a very close correlation between TFP
calculated using the capital stock information, and TFP calculated assum-ing that capital per worker is proportional to GDP per worker. The obser-
vations mostly lie above the 45-degree line because India has a relatively
small capital stock, and output per worker and capital per worker are both
measured relative to India. The correlation coeﬃcient between the two
measures is 0.96. Thus, by 1990 it seems plausible to regard TFP as the pri-
mary driver of diﬀerences in income per capita across countries, with capi-
tal playing a secondary and derivative role.
6.2.4 Imperfect Capital Mobility
Above we assumed perfect capital mobility. Since there likely were and
are frictions in international capital markets, let us consider whether our
conclusion that income diﬀerences were driven by TFP diﬀerences has to be
weakened once we allow for imperfect capital mobility, and therefore diﬀer-
ences in the rental on capital across countries. To see how diﬀerences in the
rental cost of capital modify our analysis, again compute the rental on cap-
ital by diﬀerentiating equation (1). Allowing this to diﬀer across countries,
and expressing all variables in country i relative to India, we obtain4
(3 )  
K
Li











  (1  )
.
Thus, the amount of capital employed will vary inversely with its rental,
which now appears on the right of equation (3 ). Substituting equation (3 )
into equation (2), we obtain the following expression for output per capita:
(4 )  
Y
Li





 /(1  )
.
Comparing equations (3 ) and (4 ), we see that capital/worker and out-
put/worker diﬀer by exactly the rental term, so that
(5 )  
K
Li







Countries with lower rentals will attract more capital. Note that relative
TFP (with     0) can still be calculated as in equation (1 ). The rental of
capital is, of course, the product of the rate of return on capital in each
country and the purchase price of capital goods. The evidence we have on
the purchase price of capital goods for 1910 is the cost of fully equipped
cotton spinning and weaving mills per spindle. This is a reasonably good
general index of the cost of capital goods in these countries because cot-
ton mills generally embodied imported machinery and power plants com-
bined with local construction of the buildings. We also saw above little sign
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4. From note 3, the rental on capital is Ri    Ai(Ki/Li)( –1)(T i/Li) . Now divide this by the
same equation for India and express all variables relative to India, to obtain, Ri  
Ai(Ki/Li)( –1)(T i/Li) . Then equation (3 ) follows directly.that rates of return on capital correlated with output per person in 1900–
14.Thus the purchase price of capital goods in 1910 should be a reasonably
good estimator of the rental cost of capital. Figure 6.8 shows these mea-
sures of capital costs relative to output per person in 1910. There is no
strong sign in the pre–World War I international economy of any link be-
tween rental costs of capital and output per capita. Thus, at least for this
period we do not need to worry about restricted capital mobility very
much.
The PWT do report signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the purchase prices of cap-
ital goods across countries in the post–World War II period, however. For
the data in 1990, we can repeat some of our earlier regressions allowing for
the eﬀect of capital rental diﬀerences. Data on the price of investment
goods are taken from the benchmark surveys for the PWT, as described in
Jones (1994) and also used in De Long and Summers (1991).5 Several types
of capital goods are available, and we use here the overall price of invest-
ment goods. The rental on investment goods is, of course, the interest rate
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Fig. 6.8 The estimated purchase price of capital in 1910
Sources: Table 6.1 and Clark (1987).
Notes: Output per person is measured as an index with India set equal to 1. The symbols
used are as follows: A (Austria), Fr (France), Ge (Germany), GB (Great Britain), I (India), It
(Italy), Ja (Japan), Po (Portugal), Ru (Russia), Sp (Spain), Sz (Switzerland), and US (United
States).
5. These data are available at [http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/chad/RelPrice.asc].times its purchase price. For these years we do not have information on in-
terest rates by country. However, provided that interest rates (and depreci-
ation rates) do not vary with output per capita, we can use the purchase
price of investment goods as a proxy for its rental in our estimations.
Regressing the log of capital per worker on the log of GDP per capita and
also the log of the rental, we obtain
ln     0.17   1.16 ln     0.47 ln(rental),
(0.11) (0.08) (0.23)
N   52, R2   0.89.
The sample used here is on all countries of the PWT for which capital stocks
are available for 1990, and we also have the price of investment goods in
1980 reported in Jones (1994). The coeﬃcient on ln(GDP/worker) is re-
duced by inclusion of the rental, so that it becomes closer to unity. The
rental itself has a negative coeﬃcient, as predicted from (5 ), but less than
unity; given the measurement error that is present in using the purchase
price of investment goods rather than their rental, it is not surprising that
this coeﬃcient is biased toward zero.
Computing TFP according to equation (1 ) using the value of   0.4, we
can treat this and the rental price of investment goods as the underlying de-
terminants of income, and run equation (4 ) to obtain
ln(GDP per capita)   0.27   1.65 ln(TFP)   0.67 ln(rental),
(0.08) (0.12) (0.18)
N   52, R2   0.87.
Once again, we ﬁnd that TFP has a magniﬁed impact on income per capita,
with an elasticity of 1.65, via its direct eﬀect and its induced eﬀect on capi-
tal allocation. The relative contributions of TFP versus the rental in ex-
plaining GDP per capita can be decomposed from this regression accord-
ing to
var(GDP per capita)   1.652 var(TFP)   0.672 var(rental) 
  2.21 cov   var(error),
where the covariance is between TFP and the rental on investment goods.
Using the sample values for these variances, we ﬁnd that TFP explains fully
two-thirds of the variance in GDP per capita, whereas the rental only ex-
plains 5 percent of this variation, with the covariance between TFP and the
rental explaining another 16 percent of this variation. This, including the
rental on capital across countries, does not change our conclusion that TFP
is the driving force behind diﬀerences in GDP per capita, with capital/







292 Gregory Clark and Robert C. FeenstraWhere do these diﬀerences in productivity come from? Some recent au-
thors have argued that geography or climate (Sachs 2001), or institutions
(Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001), or social capital (Jones and Hall
1999) plays an important role. We do not dispute that these may be impor-
tant, but our approach is diﬀerent. Rather than looking for some external
cause for countries to diﬀer in their eﬃciency levels, we will instead look in-
ternally at productivity itself, and ask whether the cross-country variation
in TFP should be attributed to the access to or to the use of technologies.
6.3 Access to Technology
We see that the increased disparity in income per capita across the world
stemmed largely from an increased disparity in the eﬃciency of economies,
the amount of output produced per unit of input. The next thing we show
is that little of this disparity stemmed from diﬀerences in access to technol-
ogy.  Economic growth since the Industrial Revolution has been largely
based on an expansion of knowledge. The fact that the Industrial Revolu-
tion came from an increase in knowledge, rather than from capital accu-
mulation or from the exploitation of natural resources, seemed to imply
that it would spread with great rapidity to other parts of the world, for al-
though developing new knowledge is an arduous task, copying innovations
is much easier. Also, although some of the new technology eventually was
very sophisticated, some of it was relatively simple, or required little techni-
cal expertise to operate. Thus, artiﬁcial fertilizers in the late nineteenth cen-
tury, and new strains of crops in the twentieth, for example, which dramat-
ically boosted agricultural yields, were both relatively simple technologies
for poor countries to adopt. Further, given the possibilities of specialization
in international trade, the poorer countries did not need to acquire all the
new Western technology. They could instead adopt the simplest and most
easily transferable techniques, and import products embodying more so-
phisticated processes from the more economically advanced countries. In
textiles, for example, spinning coarse yarn was much easier technically than
spinning ﬁne yarn. Countries such as India could thus specialize in coarse
yarn, and import ﬁner cloth.
Further, there were a series of interrelated technical, organizational, and
political developments in the nineteenth century that made technological
transmission much easier. The important technological changes were the
improvements in transport through the development of railways, steam-
ships, the Suez and (later) Panama canals, and the telegraph. The organiza-
tional change was the development of specialized machine-building ﬁrms in
Great Britain and later the United States. The political changes were the ex-
tension of European colonial empires to large parts of Africa and Asia, and
the political developments within European countries. By the eve of World
War I the ﬁrst great globalization of the world economy was complete. Po-
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earlier globalization, but even by 1914 it was clear that diﬀerences in the
eﬃciency of economies could not be attributed just to diﬀerences in the type
of technology employed.
6.3.1 Transport and Communication
In the course of the nineteenth century, land transportation, even in the
poorest countries, was revolutionized by the spread of railways. Table 6.3
shows the miles of railroad completed in selected countries by 1850, 1890,
and 1910. The great expansion of the rail network in the late nineteenth cen-
tury, even in very poor and underdeveloped countries such as Russia and
India, improved communication between the coast and the interior im-
mensely (remember, the circumference of the earth is only 26,000 miles).
Railroad development was associated with imperialism. Thus, independent
countries such as China had little railway development before 1914.
Ocean transport was similarly revolutionized in this period by the devel-
opment of the steamboat. In the 1830s and 1840s, although steamships
were faster and more punctual than sailing ships, they were used only for the
most valuable and urgent cargo, such as mail, because of their very high
coal consumption. The huge amount of coal that had to be carried limited
the amount of cargo they could hold on transoceanic voyages. To sail from
Bombay to Aden in 1830 the Hugh Lindsay “had to ﬁll its hold and cabins
and pile its decks with coal, barely leaving enough room for the crew and
the mail” (Headrick 1988, 24). The liner Britanniain the 1840s required 640
tons of coal to cross the Atlantic with 225 tons of cargo. Thus, even in the
1850s steam power was used only for perishable and high-value cargoes.
But in the 1850s and 1860s four innovations lowered the cost of steam
transport. These were the screw propeller, iron hulls (iron-hulled boats were
30–40 percent lighter and gave 15 percent more cargo capacity for a given
amount of steam power), compound engines that were much more fuel eﬃ-
cient, and surface condensers (previously steamboats had to use seawater to
make steam, which produced corrosion and fouling of the engine). These
last two innovations greatly reduced the coal consumption of engines per
horsepower per hour. In the 1830s it took 4 kg of coal to produce 1 hp-hour,
but by 1881 the quantity was down to 0.8 kg. This directly reduced costs,
but since it also allowed ships to carry less coal and more cargo there was a
further reduction in costs. Real ocean freight costs fell by nearly 35 percent
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Table 6.3 Railway Mileage Completed
Year Britain United States Germany France Russia India
1850 6,088 9,021 3,639 1,811 311 0
1890 17,291 208,152 26,638 20,679 19,012 16,918
1910 19,999 351,767 38,034 25,156 41,373 32,789from 1870 to 1910. In 1906, for example, it cost 8 shillings to carry a ton of
cotton goods by rail the thirty miles from Manchester to Liverpool, but
only 30 s. to ship those goods the 7,250 miles from Liverpool to Bombay.
This cost of shipping cotton cloth was less than 1 percent of the cost of the
goods. By the late nineteenth century industrial locations with good water
access that were on well-established shipping routes—Bombay, Calcutta,
Madras, Shanghai, Hong Kong—could get access to all the industrial in-
puts of Great Britain at costs not very much higher than many British ﬁrms.
In part this was because, since Great Britain’s exports were mainly manu-
factures with high value per unit volume, there was excess shipping capac-
ity on the leg out from Great Britain, making the transport of industrial
machinery and parts to underdeveloped countries such as India relatively
cheap.
While freight costs fell, these technical advances also increased the speed
of travel across the oceans. The fastest P&O (Peninsular and Oriental
Steam Navigation Company) liner in 1842, the Hindustan, had a speed of
10 knots per hour. By 1912 P&O’s fastest boat, the Maloja, could do 18
knots. The speed of travel across oceans was further enhanced by the open-
ing of the great canals, the Suez canal in 1869 and the Panama canal in 1914.
The Suez canal alone saved 41 percent of the distance on the journey from
London to Bombay and 32 percent of the distance on the journey from
London to Shanghai. Thus, although in the 1840s it took sailing ships
from ﬁve to eight very uncomfortable months to get to India, by 1912 in
principal the journey could be done in ﬁfteen days.
The last of the important technical innovations in the late nineteenth cen-
tury was the development of the telegraph. For the poorest countries of
Africa and the East the key development was the invention of submarine
cables for the telegraph. In the 1840s if an Indian ﬁrm bought British textile
machinery and ran into problems with it, it would take the ﬁrm at best ten
months to receive any return communication from the machine builders. In
1851 the ﬁrst submarine telegraph cable was laid between France and En-
gland. By 1865 India was linked to Great Britain by a telegraph system
partly over land that could transmit messages in twenty-four hours, and in
1866 a successful transatlantic telegraph service had been established.
Thus, by 1866 orders and instructions could be communicated halfway
across the world in days.
These changes together made the world a much smaller place in the late
nineteenth century than it had been earlier. Information could travel much
faster. We know, for example, that the average time it took news to travel
from Rome to Cairo in the ﬁrst three centuries .., when Egypt was a
province of the Roman Empire, was about one mile per hour. As late as the
early eighteenth century it had taken four days to send letters 200 miles
within Great Britain. With the telegraph, rail, and steamship it was possible
to send information across the world in much less time. The steamship and
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goods. And the development of the steamship made the cost of reaching
far-ﬂung places quite low as long as they had good access to ocean naviga-
tion. The technological basis for the export of Industrial Revolution tech-
nologies to almost any country in the world thus seemed to have been com-
pleted by the last quarter of the nineteenth century.
6.3.2 Organizational Changes
In the early nineteenth century a specialized machine-building sector de-
veloped within the Lancashire cotton industry. These machinery ﬁrms,
some of which (such as Platt) were exporting at least 50 percent of their pro-
duction as early as 1845–70, had an important role in exporting textile tech-
nology. These capital goods ﬁrms were able to provide a complete package
of services to prospective foreign entrants to the textile industry, which in-
cluded technical information, machinery, construction expertise, and man-
agers and skilled operatives. By 1913 the six largest machine producers em-
ployed over 30,000 workers (Bruland 1989, 5, 6, 34). These ﬁrms reduced
the risks to foreign entrepreneurs by such practices as giving them machines
on a trial basis and undertaking to supply skilled workers to train the local
labor force. As a result, ﬁrms like Platt sold all around the world. Table 6.4
shows the number of orders for ring-spinning frames Platt took (each order
typically involved numbers of machines) for a sample of nine years in each
of the periods 1890–1914 and 1915–1934. Indeed, for ring frames England
was a small share of Platt’s market throughout these years.
Similar capital goods exporters developed in the rail sectors, and later in
the United States in the boot and shoe industry. British construction crews
completed railways in many foreign countries under the captainship of such
ﬂamboyant entrepreneurs as Lord Brassey. The reason again for the over-
seas exodus was in part the saturation of the rail market within Great
Britain by the 1870s after the boom years of railway construction. By 1875,
in a boom lasting just forty-ﬁve years, 71 percent of all the railway line ever
constructed in Great Britain was completed. Thereafter the major markets
for British contractors and engine constructors were overseas. India, for ex-
ample, got most of its railway equipment from Great Britain, and the In-
dian railway mileage by 1910 was signiﬁcantly greater than the British, as
table 6.3 has shown.
6.3.3 Political Developments
A number of political developments should have speeded up the export
of technology in the nineteenth century. The most important of these was
the expansion of the European colonial territories. By 1900 the European
powers controlled as colonies 35 percent of the land surface of the world,
even excluding from this reckoning Asiatic Russia. Thus, of a world area of
57.7 million square miles Europe itself constitutes only 3.8 million square
296 Gregory Clark and Robert C. Feenstramiles, but by 1900 its dependencies covered 19.8 million square miles. The
British Empire was the largest, covering 9.0 million square miles; the
French had 4.6 million, the Netherlands 2.0 million, and Germany 1.2 mil-
lion.
Even many countries formally outside of the control of European pow-
ers were forced to cede trading privileges and special rights to Europeans.
Thus, China was forced in the course of the nineteenth century to cede var-
ious treaty ports, such as Shanghai. The political control by countries such
as Great Britain of so much of the world allowed entrepreneurs to export
machinery and techniques to low-wage areas with little risk of expropria-
tion. Thus the great increase in the scope and eﬀectiveness of British polit-
ical power in the course of the nineteenth century made it easier to export
capital from Great Britain to support new textile industries. Most of the In-
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Table 6.4 Platt Ring Frame Orders by Country, 1890–1934
Sales, 1890–1914 Sales, 1914–36




























United States 2 0
West Africa 0 2
Source: Lancashire Record Oﬃce.dian subcontinent and Burma was brought under British administrative
control in 1858, and Egypt fell to Britain in 1882. In 1842 the British secured
Hong Kong from China, and in 1858 they achieved a concession in Shang-
hai. These were all localities with very low wage rates and easy access to ma-
jor sea routes. The joint eﬀect of these technological and political develop-
ments was to create by 1900 an expanded British economy spanning the
globe. British policy within its empire was to eliminate barriers to trade and
to allow economic activity to proceed wherever the market deemed most
proﬁtable. In India, for example, despite protests from local interests the
British insisted on a free trade policy between Great Britain and India. Any
manufacturer who set up a cotton mill in Bombay was assured of access to
the British market on the same terms as British mills.
The nature of British imperialism also ensured that no country was re-
strained from the development of industry up until 1917 by the absence of
a local market of suﬃcient size. Because of the British policy of free trade
pursued in the nineteenth century, Great Britain itself and most British de-
pendencies were open to imports with no tariﬀ or else a low tariﬀ for rev-
enue purposes only. The large Indian market, which took a large share of
English textile production, for example, was open on the same terms to all
foreign producers. There was a 3.5 percent revenue tariﬀ on imports, but a
countervailing tax was applied to local Indian mills at the insistence of
Manchester manufacturers. The Chinese textile market, at the insistence of
the imperial powers, was also protected by a 5 percent ad valorem revenue
tariﬀ.
6.4 Eﬃciency in the Use of Technology
Although railways, cotton mills, and other advanced technologies spread
rapidly around the world by the late nineteenth century as a result of the
above factors, the eﬃciency with which this technology was used diﬀered
greatly across countries. It was this ineﬃciency in use that in practice lim-
ited the spread of new production technologies. We illustrate this using the
example of the railroads, but an equivalent story can be told for cotton tex-
tiles (Clark 1987; Wolcott and Clark 1999).
Output in each country is measured as a weighted sum of the number of
tons of freight hauled, the ton-miles of freight, and passenger-miles of pas-
sengers. Both tons of freight and ton-miles were used because the average
length of haul varied greatly and the ﬁxed costs in hauling freight from load-
ing and unloading were substantial compared to the costs of hauling goods
another ton-mile.6 Freight output was thus estimated as (tons   $0.285  
ton-miles  $0.0066). The quality of passenger service varied greatly, which
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6. From freight revenues across countries we estimate that the cost of freight hauling a ton
of freight x miles in the United States in 1914 in $(0.285   0.0066z).shows up in the revenue generated per passenger-mile. For India, for ex-
ample, this was 2.4¢ per mile for ﬁrst class and 0.4¢ for fourth class. We thus
adjusted passenger-miles by assuming ﬁrst class was equivalent everywhere
and weighting passenger-miles in other classes according to the relative rev-
enue generated per passenger-mile. This weighted passenger-mile ﬁgure
was multiplied by $0.023, the average revenue per passenger mile for ﬁrst
class. Table 6.5 shows the implied output per worker and output per track
mile in dollars. On this measure, output per worker in the United States in
1914 was six times output per worker in India, even though India was using
an equivalent technology.
Since Indian rail equipment was mostly imported from Great Britain, a
better comparison might be with the United Kingdom. U.K. output per
worker was three times output per worker in India. Figure 6.9shows output
per worker on the railways circa 1914 in the countries for which we can get
data, versus real GDP per capita for the same countries in 1910. This low
output per worker in the poorer countries has little to do with capital/labor
substitution in response to lower wages. One measure of the intensity of
capital utilization is the number of miles locomotives were driven per year.
This varies much less across countries and is uncorrelated with the level of
income of the country. As column (5) of table 6.5 shows, the overall eﬃ-
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Table 6.5 Railroad Operating Eﬃciency circa 1914
Output per Output per Miles per
Worker Track Mile Eﬃciency Locomotive
Country Year ($) ($) (United States   1) per Year
Australia 1914 691 4,421 0.41 24,243
Austria 1912 567 9,677 0.61 16,934
Belgium 1912 959 10,332 0.78 18,282
Canada 1914 1,400 5,487 0.62 25,175
China 1916 389 5,495 0.37 30,408
Denmark 1914 709 6,669 0.53 15,006
France 1911 772 7,451 0.59 22,926
Germany 1913 857 11,826 0.81 25,746
Hungary 1912 653 5,443 0.45 —
India 1914 297 4,208 0.28 —
Japan 1914 507 6,488 0.46 27,196
The Netherlands 1912 812 6,982 0.57 32,330
Romania 1913 489 6,738 0.46 23,340
Siam 1914 389 2,128 0.21 17,592
Sweden 1912 739 3,288 0.35 22,442
Switzerland 1913 577 6,831 0.49 —
United Kingdom 1912 898 9,457 0.72 25,854
United States 1914 1,743 10,565 1.00 26,092
Sources: Boag (1912); Bureau of Railway Economics (1915); various national railway statistics.
Note: Our method means that output per worker is measured in the same prices everywhere. Dashes in-
dicate data are not available.ciency of the rail systems of these countries also varies greatly. The eﬃ-
ciency of the Indian rail system was only 28 percent of that of the U.S. sys-
tem and 39 percent of that in the United Kingdom. These diﬀerences in the
eﬃciency of operation of the rail system between countries like India and
the United States and United Kingdom are almost as great as the diﬀer-
ences in calculated TFP for these economies as a whole.
Note that the Indian rail system, for example, had extensive British ex-
pertise in its operation. In 1910 the Indian railroads employed 7,207
“Europeans” (mainly British) and 8,862 “Eurasians” (principally Anglo-
Indians), who occupied almost all the supervisory and skilled positions. In-
dian locomotive drivers were employed only after 1900, and even as late as
1910 many of the locomotive drivers were British (Morris and Dudley 1975,
202–04; Headrick 1988, 322).
The problem of operating Western technology eﬃciently in poor coun-
tries like India was the main barrier to the spread of this technology. Table
6.6, for example, shows the gross proﬁt rates of Bombay cotton mills by
quinquennia from 1905–09 to 1935–39, as well as the size of the Bombay in-
dustry and the output per worker in Bombay as an index with 1905–09 set
at 100. As can be seen, proﬁts were never great, but the industry grew sub-
stantially in the era of modest proﬁts up to 1924. Thereafter, however, prof-
its collapsed (as a result of Japanese competition), and the Bombay indus-
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Fig. 6.9 Output per worker on railways versus GDP per capita, 1910
Note: A1 is New South Wales; A2 is South Australia. Otherwise country codes are as in pre-
vious ﬁgures. Output is measured relative to the U.S., set at 1.try soon began to contract. The last column shows what was happening to
output per worker in Japan, where, with the same machinery as in India (in
both cases purchased from England), output per worker increased greatly.
Thus, the crucial variable in explaining the success or failure of economies
in the years 1800–2000 seems to be the eﬃciency of the production process
within the economy. And the diﬀerences in the ability to employ technology
seemingly got larger over time between rich and poor countries.
6.5 Trade Patterns and the Sources of Ineﬃciency
Despite the importance of TFP diﬀerences, we have very little idea what
generates them. We now consider using the pattern of trade to determine
whether these TFP diﬀerences speciﬁcally adhered to labor in poor coun-
tries, or lay in some wider managerial failure.
The dominance of Great Britain and its free trade ideology in much of the
world circa 1910 meant that trade barriers were low for the countries with
the majority of world population in 1910—India (including modern Pak-
istan, Bangladesh, and Burma), China, Great Britain, Ireland, Egypt,
Nigeria, and South Africa. However, the trade patterns for the factors of
production within this relatively open world market were often not what we
might expect. In particular, the densely populated countries of the East—
India, China, and Egypt (counting the cultivable land)—seem to have been
net exporters of land and net importers of labor. Table 6.7, for example,
shows British India’s commodity trade in 1912. The only manufactured
good that India exported any quantity of was jute sacking. In the case of
cotton the raw material content of India’s exports of raw cotton about
equaled in value the raw material value of India’s imports. Thus India eﬀec-
tively exported its raw cotton to Great Britain to be manufactured there,
paying for this with the export of other raw materials. The eﬀective net raw
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Table 6.6 The Bombay Industry, 1907–38
Gross Proﬁt Size of the Bombay Output per Output per
Rate on Fixed Industry (millions of  Worker in Bombay Worker in Japan
Year Capital spindle-equivalents) (index) (index)
1905–09 0.06 3.09 100 100
1910–14 0.05 3.43 103 115
1915–19 0.07 3.68 99 135
1920–24 0.08 4.05 94 132
1925–29 –0.00 4.49 91 180
1930–34 0.00 4.40 104 249
1935–39 0.02 3.91 106 281
Source: Wolcott and Clark (1999).
Note: Proﬁts and output per worker were calculable only for the mills listed in the Investor’s India Year-
book (various years).material export of India in 1912 was about $460 million. With Indian GDP
measured in U.S. prices at about $11.5 billion this implies that exports of
raw materials were about 4 percent of Indian GDP. Why was densely pop-
ulated India poor and agricultural in 1912, as opposed to being poor and
industrial?
If we look at the pattern of exports and imports in the cotton industry in-
ternationally around 1910 we see other possible anomalies in the pattern of
trade. Table 6.8 shows, for example, the ﬂow of manufactured cotton goods
internationally. Cotton was the major manufacture in world trade at this time
because of its low transport cost relative to price and the existence of a mar-
ket for yarn and cloth across countries at all income levels. That Argentina,
Australia, Canada, and Brazil were net importers of manufactured cotton
goods (even though Brazil was a major producer of raw cotton) is entirely ex-
pected given that these were land-rich countries. But the substantial import-
ing of cotton goods by densely populated British India, China, and Egypt (all
substantial producers of raw cotton) is on the face of it rather puzzling. We
turn next to a possible explanation from trade theory for this puzzle.
6.6 The Factor-Content Model
As noted in the introduction, Treﬂer (1993, 1995) has shown how various
forms of generalized versus factor-speciﬁc technology diﬀerences across
countries can be introduced into the HOV model. Such technology diﬀer-
ences may help to explain why India was an exporter of land-intensive
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Table 6.7 The Commodity Trade of British India, 1912–13 (in $ millions)
Commodity Imports Exports Net Exports
Grain, pulse, and ﬂour 0.42 195.64 195.21
Jute, raw 0.00 87.76 87.76
Cotton—raw 7.21 91.20 83.99
Seeds 0.00 73.68 73.68
Hides and skins 0.71 53.11 52.40
Tea 0.23 43.13 42.90
Opium 0.00 36.41 36.41
Oils 16.94 2.78 –14.15
Sugar 46.33 0.00 –46.33
Other raw materials 34.20 64.79 30.58
All raw materials 106.04 648.50 542.46
Cotton—piece goods 195.73 39.58 –156.15
Metals 50.30 3.48 –46.81
Railway plant 20.77 0.00 –20.77
Hardware 17.57 0.00 –17.57
Jute—piece goods 0.00 74.20 74.20
Other manufactures 108.88 5.99 –102.90
All manufactures 393.25 123.26 –270.00
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce (1915).goods at the turn of the century. Although this fact is consistent with the
sheer size of the Indian subcontinent, it seems inconsistent with her very
large population. One resolution of this puzzle would be that each worker
in India is less productive than those abroad, so the eﬀective population
there is smaller than otherwise.
The HOV model expresses trade in terms of the factor content of exports
and imports—that is, the amounts of labor, capital, land, and so on em-
bodied in the goods that are traded. That is, the factor content of trade for
country c is deﬁned as F c   AT c, where
• Tc   Yc – Dc is the (N   1) vector of net exports of goods i   1, . . . , N
for country c, where Yc is production and D c is consumption;
• A   [aki] is a (M   N) matrix giving the amount of primary factor 
k   1, . . . , M used to produce one unit of production in industry 
i   1, . . . , N. (This matrix should include the primary factors used
both directly and indirectly).7
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Table 6.8 World Trade in Cotton Textiles, 1910 (in $ millions)
All Cotton Cotton Grey Colored
Goods Yarn Cloth Cloth
All Net Exporters
United Kingdom 453.2 83.4 99.8 270.0
Japan 26.2 22.3 4.6 –0.7
Italy 23.9 4.2 2.9 16.8
France 23.4 –2.7 4.3 21.9
Germany 15.0 –11.3 –2.7 28.9
United States 8.5 –3.5 8.3 3.6
Spain 5.9 0.0 (5.9)
Austria-Hungary 3.4 –4.1 0.2 7.3
The Netherlands 3.2 –13.8 7.5 9.5
Russia 2.7 –4.4 (7.2)
Major Importers
British India –100.1 17.8 –53.1 –64.8
China –80.9 –40.8 –10.6 –29.5
Argentina –28.6 –2.7 –0.9 –25.0
Australia –24.8 –2.0 –1.2 –21.6
Ottoman Empire –19.7 –1.1 –7.4 –11.2
Egypt –18.2 –1.4 (–16.8)
Canada –11.6 –1.9 –0.8 –8.8
Brazil –11.1 –2.5 0.0 –8.6
Source: U.S. House of Representatives (1912, vol. 1, appendix A, 212–18).
Notes: Other large net importers were Romania (–9.9), Chile (–9.3), Algeria (–9.2), British
South Africa (–7.7), Venezuela (–4.3), and Bulgaria (–4.3). Numbers in parentheses are those
where gray and colored cloth is given together.
7. If D denotes the (K   N) matrix giving the direct requirements of primary factors to pro-
duce one unit of output in each industry, and B is the (N   N) input-output matrix for the
country, then the total primary factor requirements are computed as A   D(I – B)–1.Focusing on the case in which labor, capital, and land are the primary fac-
tors, then F c   (F Lc, F Kc, F Tc) will have three elements, giving the net exports
of these factors for country c. Notice that we have not included a subscript
on the matrix A, and because it is diﬃcult to obtain the primary factors re-
quirement for many countries, the convention has been to use A for a base
country—say, the United Kingdom. At the same time, we allow for a gen-
eral pattern of factor-speciﬁc productivity diﬀerences across countries, so
that factor k used in country c has productivity  kc, where these are mea-
sured relative to the productivity in the base country.
Consistent with the measurement of F c using the technology of the base
country, Treﬂer (1995) extends the HOV model to show how the factor-
content of trade is related to the eﬀective endowments labor, capital, and
land, where these are measured in eﬃciency units  kc. That is, letting  LcLc,
 KcKc,  TcT cdenote the eﬀective endowments of the factors in country c, the
HOV model predicts that












where sc   Y c/∑C
j 0Y j denotes the share of country c’s GDP in world GDP.8
To interpret these equations, equation (6A) states that country c will be a
net exporter of labor services, F Lc   0, if its eﬀective endowment of labor,
 LcLc, exceeds its GDP share sc times the world eﬀective endowment of la-
bor, ∑C
j 0 LjLj. Put simply, if country c is abundant in labor (with  LcLc/
∑C
j 0 LjLj   sc), then it will be a net exporter of labor. A similar interpreta-
tion holds for the other factors.
Let us now return to the puzzle: Why was India a net exporter of land-
intensive products around the turn of the century? We interpret this state-
ment to mean that if the full factor content calculation were done, India
would be found to be a net exporter of land, so that F Tc   0. In addition, we
expect that India would be found to be a net importer of either capital, F Kc 
0, or labor, F Lc   0. Thus, for India we would write equations (6A)–(6C) as
(7A)  LcLc   sc∑
C
j 0
 LjLj   0, or
(7B)  KcKc   sc∑
C
j 0
 KjKj   0, and
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8. More precisely, scdenotes the share of country c’s consumption in world consumption, but
this will equal its share of world GDP if trade is balanced for country c.(7C)  TcT c   sc∑
C
j 0
 TjT j   0.
Depending on whether inequality (7A) or (7B) holds, these taken together




















































From the second inequality in each set, the eﬀective land endowment of In-
dia, relative to the world, must be at least as large as its GDP share in order
for it to be a net exporter of land. Data on actual endowments of land, and
GDPs, will therefore allow us to make some conclusion about the eﬀective
productivity of land, along with capital and labor.
We see that just the sign pattern of the factor-content of trade is enough
to place some bounds on the factor-speciﬁc productivity diﬀerences in In-
dia.9 To simplify these inequalities, consider the corresponding equations
for the United Kingdom (labeled b). We expect that if the full factor-content
calculation were done, the United Kingdom would be found to be a net im-
porter of land, so that F Tb   0, and a net exporter of either capital, F Kb   0,
or labor, F Lb   0. That is, these inequalities are just the reverse as obtained
for India. Recalling that the eﬃciency of each factor is normalized at unity
































































T c  .
To interpret the ﬁrst set of inequalities, if India is a net importer of labor and
exporter of land (and conversely for the United Kingdom), then (a) the rel-
ative eﬃciency of land in India  Tc must be at least as high as (sc/T c)/(sb/T b),
that is, their relative shares of GDP compared to land; (b) the relative eﬃ-
ciency of labor in India  Lc cannot exceed (sc/Lc)/(sb/Lb), that is, their rela-
tive shares of GDP compared to labor. Taken together, we conclude that the
eﬃciency of land relative to labor in India,  Tc / Lc, must be at least as high
as (Lc/T c)/(Lb/T b), which is simply (population/acre) in India versus the
United Kingdom.
In the next section, we will apply these inequalities to estimate the rela-
tive productivity of labor and land in 1910 and 1990. Before turning to these
results, it might be useful to contrast the HOV approach with the single-
Technology in the Great Divergence 305
9. Brecher and Choudhri (1982) also make use of the sign pattern of U.S. trade in 1947 (when
it exported both labor and capital) to draw some conclusions.sector Cobb-Douglas function used earlier in the paper. With the single sec-
tor, we were assuming that TFP varied across countries and acted as a driv-
ing force behind capital mobility. We ignored the contribution of land to
total GDP in modern times. Once we introduce trade data, however, it
becomes quite relevant to incorporate trade in agricultural goods, and the
amount of land embodied in trade. In our calculations below, we will focus
on the labor and land content of trade, while ignoring capital embodied in
trade. Thus, we do not need to take any stand on the extent of capital ﬂows
between countries, and how this responds to productivity. Rather, we will
simply treat the labor and land endowments as exogenous across countries,
although diﬀering in their productivities, and use their endowments com-
bined with the factor contents of trade to infer the factor productivities.
6.7 Evidence from the Sign Pattern of Trade
To  illustrate these calculations, some data on population, land area,
GDP, and their ratios are shown in table 6.9 for 1910 and in table 6.10 for
1990. These are all measured relative to world totals. For example, the ﬁg-
ure of 0.36 for GDP/population in India for 1910 indicates that India has 36
percent of the world average GDP per capita. Surprisingly, this number re-
mained much the same in 1990 (dropping just slightly to 0.34), although this
ﬁnding relies on the fact that we are using the purchasing power parity
(PPP)–adjusted GDP values from the PWT. Prices are so low in India that
its GDP is 3.5 times higher in the PWT for 1990 than obtained from World
Bank data, which convert its nominal GDP to dollars with current ex-
change rates. In contrast to the roughly constant value for India, most Eu-
ropean nations have increased their level of real GDP per capita relative to
the world, in some cases nearly doubling their world share. This is consis-
tent with the divergence in income levels described in section 6.2, of course.
We also report GDP relative to crop acreage, or crop plus pasture, and these
show a mixed pattern between 1910 and 1990—increasing for some Euro-
pean nations relative to the world, but falling for others.
To use these data to estimate the productivity of factors, we focus on In-
dia relative to some comparison countries. Choosing the United Kingdom
as the initial comparison, we use the ﬁrst set of inequalities in equation (10).
Then their ratio of per capita GDP is shown in the column marked (1) in
table 6.11, which provides an upper bound to the eﬃciency of labor in India
relative to the United Kingdom. The value of 0.13 indicates that an Indian
worker is less than13 percent as productive as his counterpart in the United
Kingdom.10 The ratios of GDP to crop land or crop plus pasture are shown
in columns (2) and (3), and provide lower bounds to the eﬃciency of land in
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10. Rather than using total population in tables 6.9 and 6.10, we should actually use esti-
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.India relative to the United Kingdom. They give a value of 0.04 or 0.11, im-
plying that a hectare of land in India is at least 4 percent as productive (11
percent for crop land) as that in the United Kingdom. Putting together
these estimates for labor and land, we obtain the ﬁnal columns in table 6.11,
which show that the eﬃciency of crop land relative to labor is at least 0.33
in India relative to the United Kingdom (or 0.85 for crop plus pasture). Be-
cause these values are less than unity, we do not ﬁnd evidence of factor-
speciﬁc productivity diﬀerences. That is, the trade patterns for India and the
United Kingdom, as measured by signs of their factor-content of trade, are
consistent with generalized ineﬃciency within India.
One explanation for this ﬁnding is the extremely small size of the British
Isles, so that when measured relative to population, the United Kingdom is
scarce in land compared to India. Another explanation, though, is that the
United Kingdom may not have the opposite sign pattern of trade as India,
in which case the inequalities in equation (10) do not apply. In fact, using
the data of Estevadeordal and Taylor (2001, 2002) circa 1910 and Treﬂer
(1993, 1995) for 1983, it turns out that the United Kingdom is a net im-
porter of both land and labor, whereas we presume that India is a net ex-
porter of land and importer of labor. So it makes sense to work with some
other European countries that have the opposite sign pattern of trade from
India.
Using Estevadeordal and Taylor’s (2002a, b) data, we ﬁnd that there are
only three countries that have the opposite sign pattern of trade as India in
1910, being net importers of land (measured by renewable resources) and
net exporters of labor: Finland, Germany, and Sweden. These three coun-
tries were still net importers of crop land and net exporters of (nonagricul-
tural) labor in 1983, according to the data from Treﬂer (1993, 1995). Treﬂer
does not report the factor-content of trade for India, but he does include
Pakistan, which is a net exporter of crop land and importer of (nonagricul-
tural) labor; we presume that the same sign patterns holds for India. Ac-
cordingly, we report results for these three comparison countries in the rest
of table 6.11.
Using Finland as the comparison country, we see that the implied eﬃ-
ciency of crop land relative to labor is at least 1.69 in 1910, and that this
lower bound has risen to 2.45 in 1990. In this case, there is evidence of bi-
ased technological change, with land in India becoming increasingly pro-
ductive relative to labor. To understand where this result is coming from, we
note that the ratio of population to crop land in India, relative to the world,
has changed little in the century, falling from 1.5 in 1910 to 1.4 in 1990.11 In
contrast, Finland has experienced a larger fall in this ratio, from 0.9 in 1910
to 0.6 in 1990. With fewer persons per acre in Finland, the fact that it re-
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11. These ratios can be computed by dividing the population and cropland columns within
tables 6.9 and 6.10.mains a net importer of land indicates that the productivity of its workers
relative to land must be enhanced over time; conversely, the productivity of
Indian workers must be falling relative to land.
The results of comparing India to Sweden are similar to those for Finland
and indicate that land is more productive than labor in India, and that this
diﬀerential has been increasing over time. Again, this result can be under-
stood by noting that the ratio of population to crop land in Sweden, relative
to the world, has fallen from 1.2 in 1910 to 0.8 in 1990. Despite this, Sweden
has remained a net importer of land and net exporter of labor, with the op-
posite trade pattern in India, so the productivity of Indian workers must be
falling relative to land. When using Germany as a comparison country,
however, we do not obtain bounds that are tight enough to indicate any
factor-speciﬁc technological diﬀerences with India.
Unfortunately, there are no other countries we can use that have the op-
posite trade pattern from India. However, to check the robustness of our re-
sults, there is one other calculation we can do, at least for 1990: Namely, we
can use the number of workers in each country, rather than total population,
to measure the labor endowment. This is done at the bottom of table 6.11,
which can be compared to the results immediately above it.
We can see that using workers rather than population generally reduces
our lower-bound estimates of the eﬃciency of land relative to labor, in col-
umns (4) and (5) of table 6.11. The reason for this is that only about 40 per-
cent of the population in India is economically active workers, whereas this
percentage varies around 50 percent for Finland, Germany, Sweden, and
other European countries. Recalling that columns (4) and (5) are computed
as labor relative to land area, in India compared to each country, we expect
these ratios to fall when workers rather than population are used. Never-
theless, it remains true that land is more productive than labor in India rel-
ative to either Finland or Sweden. This supports our hypothesis that the un-
usual trade pattern of India and Pakistan, whereby they are net exporters of
land-intensive products both historically and today, is explained by a lower
eﬃciency of labor relative to land in those countries.
6.8 Conclusions
We have shown above that the fundamental cause of the divergence of in-
come per capita experienced since the Industrial Revolution is a diﬀerence
in the ability of countries to employ the same technology at equal levels of
eﬃciency. Improvements in the mobility of goods and capital fall into rela-
tive unimportance when compared to the eﬀects of diﬀerences in TFP, both
in historical periods and today.
The source of these diﬀerences in TFP remains mysterious. In this paper
we explore potential methods of testing whether these were generalized eﬃ-
ciency diﬀerences, such as would be caused by a lack of knowledge, or man-
Technology in the Great Divergence 311agerial ability in poor countries, or whether they were more speciﬁcally
linked to problems with the eﬃciency of labor in poor economies. The data
we have assembled so far support the hypothesis that labor in India has a
lower eﬃciency than land, with each measured relative to countries with the
opposite sign pattern of trade. By comparing countries with opposite trade
patterns, both in 1910 and 1990, we ended up with a very small sample: In-
dia or Pakistan relative to Finland, Germany, and Sweden. There are two
directions our research could go to enlarge this sample and gain more con-
ﬁdence in the results.
First, we could obtain further evidence on relative productivities by using
the magnitude of trade, rather than just its sign pattern. For modern times
these data are available from Treﬂer (1993, 1995). Indeed, we have utilized
the factor-eﬃciency reported by Treﬂer to compare Pakistan to a wider
range of other countries and to conﬁrm the results reported in table 6.11:
For most comparison European countries, Pakistan has a lower eﬃciency
of labor relative to land. This exercise is incomplete, however, without the
equivalent comparison for historical periods, and here the data are much
harder to obtain. Estevadeordal and Taylor (2002a, b) do not include India
(or any other developing country) in their data circa 1910, and in addition,
their units of resource endowments are incommensurate with their units
forr esources embodied in trade. Thus, we have not been able to utilize data
on the magnitude of trade to estimate factor productivities for historical
periods.
A second direction for research is to extend the HOV model we have out-
lined to incorporate nonhomothetic tastes (some progress along these lines
is made by Treﬂer 1995). The fact that India is a net exporter of land is all
the more surprising when we consider that this factor is needed to grow
food, which ﬁgures so prominently in the budgets of its poorest citizens. In
other words, the eﬀective endowment of land is lower than it appears once
we subtract that amount that is essential for its large population to survive.
This observation can be formalized in the context of the HOV model, to ob-
tain eﬀective endowments of land (and other factors) that adjust for non-
homothetic tastes. We expect that the implied factor productivities that
would come out of the resulting HOV equations would show an even lower
eﬃciency of labor in India than we have obtained. This would reinforce our
conclusion that it is the ineﬃciency of technology in its use, rather than in
its availability, that appears to limit the prospects of poorer countries.
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Comment Joel Mokyr
The sixty-four-thousand-dollar question is why the West grew rich and the
countries that were somehow not like the West did not. Clark and Feenstra
document that much of this divergence occurred after 1800. Not enough is
known about incomes to be sure if all of it occurred after 1800, although in
other papers Gregory Clark (2001) has suggested that income in Great
Britain at least was already quite high in 1800 and rose little until 1860,
which suggests that he may not quite subscribe to the “California School”
led by Pomeranz (2000) and Goldstone (2001). These scholars maintain
that the great divergence between West and “rest” was a fairly recent phe-
nomenon and that by 1800 incomes were still comparable, at least between
western Europe and the Yang-Zi delta. In any case, Clark and Feenstra at-
tribute the diﬀerence between Europeans and non-Europeans to diﬀer-
ences in productivity, and speciﬁcally labor productivity.
This paper is thus yet another installment in the Clarkian search for the
Holy Grail of productivity diﬀerences. Clark’s interpretation of the history
of productivity as he has delineated it in a string of brilliant and provocative
papers (starting with Clark 1987) is that advanced countries and poor coun-
tries faced basically the same kind of technology and had access to the same
equipment and capital goods, and that institutions and culture mattered
not one whit. And yet, for some reason, labor productivity in these poor
countries was only a fraction of what it was in the richer countries. The
diﬀerence is this mysterious substance that I shall call in his honor “factor
C,” the nature of which has never been speciﬁed. Clark has insisted that the
data indicate that there are deep and fundamental diﬀerences in TFP be-
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tional Bureau of Economic Research.tween diﬀerent economies, but he refuses even to speculate what the deeper
causes might be.
Meanwhile, here is what the paper does: Clark and Feenstra demon-
strate, using an array of techniques and data sources, that the poor coun-
tries of today were already poor and backward in 1910. Yet, they argue, they
were  not poor because their capital-labor ratios were lower than they
should have been. In fact, the paper assumes that capital markets were eﬃ-
cient enough to roughly equalize rates of return between diﬀerent countries.
Whether that assumption actually holds up or not (their own data seem to
cast some doubt on it), I think there is probably good reason to think that
capital scarcity was not the main reason that the underdeveloped countries
of 1910 were poor.
Clark and Feenstra estimate a set of Cobb-Douglas aggregate production
functions in which they calculate TFP in a world in which equalized rates of
return on capital are imposed as a constraint. In that case the amount of
capital employed would depend entirely on the eﬃciency of the economy
(since the rate of return is exogenous), and hence diﬀerences in capital-
labor ratios between poor and rich countries are not a cause of poverty but
its eﬀect. What this means, of course, is that TFP is the sole determinant of
diﬀerences in income per capita. In fact, the story as they see it is that cap-
ital is proportional to output. Low-productivity countries get punished
twice: They get lower labor productivity andlower capital-labor ratios. The
paradigmatic industry Clark and Feenstra have in mind for their observa-
tions in 1910 is railroads, on which they spend quite a bit of time. Measur-
ing capital in terms of railway line per GDP in 1910, they ﬁnd an approxi-
mate proportionality, as they do for more encompassing measures in 1990.
The diﬀerences in TFP, the authors argue, are not due to diﬀerences in
access to technology either. It is easier to copy technology and to employ it
than to develop it de novo, and they ﬁnd it hard to believe that lack of ac-
cess to it could block productivity from increasing. The use of fertilizers, the
exploitation of railroads, or the spinning of coarse cotton were all tech-
niques that required little knowledge to be applied, apart from investment
in them, and thus could be readily deployed anywhere in the world. The
well-documented globalization of the pre-1914 world was instrumental in
making this technology more accessible. While Europe and the United
States protected themselves by tariﬀs, the poorer parts were dominated by
free-trade-minded imperialist governments and had no such choice. Clark
and Feenstra document in some detail the improvement in transportation
and communication, and this material is well known and uncontroversial.
Where the paper gets really interesting is where Clark and Feenstra try to
measure “eﬃciency in the use of technology.” It is not entirely clear what is
meant by that, but in some sense it is the mother of all residuals: Once you
have accounted for all factors of production andfor diﬀerences in access to
technology, this diﬀerence in TFP is what is left to explain. For 1910, their
Technology in the Great Divergence 315test case is the eﬃciency of railroad transport, presumably a technology
that was wholly shared among poor and developed nations. Table 6.5 gives
us railroad operating eﬃciency, an interesting variable, measured as rail-
road output per worker, per track mile and “overall eﬃciency” (presumably
a weighted average of the two). By the logic of this table, however, not only
India had a problem: Austria and Switzerland, hardly third world countries
even in 1910, are only half as eﬃcient as the United States and barely better
than Japan, and in terms of overall eﬃciency China actually beats Sweden.
More perplexing, Clark and Feenstra point out that in India, whose rail-
roads are the doormat of this eﬃciency contest, railroads were run and op-
erated mostly by British engineers and experts. They conclude that “the
problem of operating Western technology eﬃciently in poor countries like
India was the main barrier to the spread of this technology.” This variable
called “operating a technology eﬃciently,” factor C if you will, remains
mysterious in nature and leaves the reader dissatisﬁed. Once or twice they
raise the issue of whether the paradox could be caused by some greater fail-
ure of “managerial ability.” But this, too, remains unresolved.
Instead, they embark on an exercise to see which of the factors of pro-
duction is responsible for the lower eﬃciency by examining the relative fac-
tor-content of traded goods. India, they point out, is more densely popu-
lated than Europe in terms of population per cultivable land, yet it is
exporting land-intensive goods. This exercise follows Dan Treﬂer’s tech-
nique of elaborating on the Leontief paradox literature, trying to ﬁnd fac-
tor-speciﬁc diﬀerences in productivity based on the factor-contents of trad-
ables. This discussion is not very easy to follow, in part because the
discussion moves somewhat quickly from a three-factor to a two-factor
world (presumably because capital is assumed to be equally eﬃcient world-
wide, although I wonder why this assumption does not get tested here) and
in part because of the need to examine countries that have opposite trade
patterns (in terms of their factor-content) from India. These countries both
turn out to be Scandinavian. Clark and Feenstra ﬁnd that Indian land is
more productive than Indian labor relative to these countries, and that this
gap got worse over the twentieth century. This is, in some sense, a demon-
stration of comparative advantage, but it also raises the classical Leontief
issue of why countries export goods intensive in factors in which they are os-
tensibly poorly endowed. Clark and Feenstra argue that India had lots of
labor, and its labor force was cheap. But that labor force lacked sadly in fac-
tor C, which made it so unproductive as to actually make India look like a
country relatively rich in land. The source of the diﬀerences in TFP, which
is to blame for everything, as the authors say, “remains mysterious.” It
seems fair to say that they obviously spent more ingenuity in posing the is-
sue than in giving us a clue as to how it may be resolved.
I should say from the outset that I do not know the answer either, and that
the best one can do is to suggest to the authors where to look a bit more
316 Gregory Clark and Robert C. Feenstraclosely. Despite the careful research in compiling and analyzing their data,
the paper conveys the impression that the authors decided to ignore the lit-
erature on virtually every one of the subtopics they deal with, and just start
with a fresh mind. Such a strategy, in some cases, makes sense and I am sure
that there are examples in the history of science in which a major break-
through was attained by a sharp and unbiased mind who did not let the ex-
isting literature that was denying the very possibility of the discovery con-
fuse him. Ignoring what has been done before does, of course, mean that
there is a certain danger of reinventing a few wheels and providing an audi-
ence with a sense of dèja vu, as well as a danger of missing clues that others
have noticed.
For instance, there are a few pages in Grossman and Helpman (1991), not
cited in this paper, that deal with the issue of the international diﬀusion of
knowledge. They point out that a country gains access to the body of
knowledge that has accumulated in the outside world through trade con-
tacts, and that this is how integration into the world economy can promote
innovation and growth. They speculate that this access is a function of the
level of trade, which would be testable given the TFPs computed by Clark
and Feenstra. I am not entirely sure that I would really expect the level of
trade to be a good proxy for the amount of contact that makes the use of
foreign technology more eﬀective, but it seems worth a look.
There is, of course, a large literature on the Leontief paradox. Whether
the introduction of human capital into the story resolved the mystery there
to his satisfaction or not, I do not know. But the words human capital and
skill do not appear in this paper, which is rather odd. Perhaps education,
and the kind of culture that workers get imbued with in some countries to
make them work harder and be more conscientious on the job, is a complete
canard in the view of the authors, but they need to dismiss it on the basis of
more evidence than is supplied here.
Moreover, in the literature there is one publication much similar to this
project, namely a small paper published by Bob Lucas (1990). Much like
Clark, Lucas has the marvelous ability to pose a very naive and elementary-
sounding question to an audience of economists, and then force them to ad-
mit that they do not know the answer even though they instinctively feel
that they should. Unlike Clark, however, Lucas does have the tendency to
suggest answers to these conundrums, and although they are not always
convincing to everyone, they seem to be suﬃciently so to account for his in-
ﬂuence. In this paper Lucas asked a simple question, namely, “Why doesn’t
capital ﬂow from rich to poor countries?” The dilemma is posed in a
similar way to Clark and Feenstra: Start from a simple C-D production 
function, plug in some stylized numbers, and take a step back: presto, a 
paradox.
Lucas ﬁgured that, given that U.S. output per worker was 15 times that of
India, the rate of return to capital should be 15 to the power of the recipro-
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in India than it is in the United States. In other words, Lucas asked the same
question as Clark and Feenstra with the exactly reversed assumption: As-
sume TFP is the same between the two countries, and let the entire diﬀer-
ence be in the rates of return. If this were even remotely true, capital should
ﬂow like mad from rich to poor countries even if the rates of return do not
end up being wholly equalized. In fact, Lucas pointed out that there should
be no investment in rich countries at all—every penny of investment should
ﬂow to poor countries.
Of course, Lucas could have stopped right there and said, well, that’s not
happening, so there must be a mysterious diﬀerence in the productivity co-
eﬃcient and that’s it. But in fact he proceeded in that paper and elsewhere
to discuss the quality of labor and human capital, not only in the sense that
more educated and better trained workers are more eﬃcient, but also in the
sense of cross–labor force externalities by which more educated workers
make other workers more eﬃcient. Lucas also worried more about interna-
tional capital markets than Clark and Feenstra. He pointed out that before
1945, with much of the recipients of capital controlled by imperialist pow-
ers, one might have expected the colonialists to behave more like labor-
market monopsonists and therefore underinvest in poor countries to keep
wages low and reap a rent. He claimed that there is no reason why such
monopsonistic power disappeared after 1945, even if it switched from for-
eigners to locals, but that political independence may have exacerbated cap-
ital market imperfections by producing risks of repudiation. Lucas then
tried to compute how much of the original gap is explained by these various
modiﬁcations, and while I cannot say that his methods are less oversimpli-
ﬁed than Clark and Feenstra’s, his paper does leave less of an aftertaste of
“un-resolvedness.”
My point, then, is not to argue that Lucas’s approach is superior to the one
here, but rather that if they had gone back and compared their methodology
with his, they might have nuanced and qualiﬁed some statements and per-
haps left us with a few more clues as to where the resolution might lie. This
is also true, mutatis mutandis, for another piece of recent scholarship, al-
though one using a very diﬀerent methodology, namely Amsden (2001).
There are some ideas in that book that might suggest to the authors where
some of the clues to their riddle might lie. In a chapter alliteratively entitled
“Tribulations of Technology Transfer,” Amsden details the many complexi-
ties in adopting Western technology, the many things that can go wrong, and
why seemingly similar forces could lead to very diﬀerent productivity out-
comes. By pointing to the important implicit or “tacit” component of tech-
nology, she is actually suggesting a new and important role for human capi-
tal and a possible clue to what factor C may be. Here Clark and Feenstra
could do worse than to read more in the work of historians of technology.
One of those, Rachel Laudan (1984, 6–7), points out that technological
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spelled out, and that eﬀective transmission requires personal contact. In her
view, this can go a long way toward explaining why technology transfer from
inventor to follower country so often fails. To be sure, the tacit component
in technology has been declining as codiﬁability has increased, but because
many techniques have become more complex, the total amount of tacit
knowledge may not have been. To understand codiﬁed knowledge, one needs
a “book of codes,” and even if the book of codes is explicit, one needs a
higher order code to read that one, and so on (Cowan and Foray 1997).
Such tacit knowledge transfers poorly from society to society, certainly
more poorly than cotton-spinning equipment, railroad cars, or bags of syn-
thetic fertilizer. Even if the British ran much of the Indian railroads, their
local unskilled workers and small station managers were still obviously at
an early stage of learning to decode English technology and management.
Hence, perhaps, the appalling productivity performance of Indian rail-
roads. Yet some of these ﬁrms were essentially Western enclaves managed
by westerners, and thus in some sense they should have performed well. One
wonders if a study of productivity by ﬁrms would yield that foreign-
managed ﬁrms performed better than native-managed. In 1913, out of 162
Indian cotton factories, 30 were managed by Europeans and 132 by Indi-
ans. Did this make a diﬀerence to productivity? If not, the role of human
capital is of course ampliﬁed, and the fact that an Indian worker in 1950 had
1.4 years of schooling as opposed to about 11 years for their U.K. and U.S.
counterparts has a lot to account for.
I have never fully understood what schools preciselydid that made people
more productive. Lucas sighs that we “need a more reﬁned view of human
capital than one in which ﬁve day-laborers equal one engineer” or, I would
add (if Clark and Feenstra are correct), in which ﬁve Indians equal one
Briton. I would suggest that we distinguish between the education, the train-
ing, and the drilling aspect of child conditioning. It seems that insofar as
schools educated people to think for themselves and to appreciate cultural
matters, we may discount their importance for productivity. This kind of ed-
ucation, after all, leads to the creation of independent thinking, perhaps the
emergence of novel ideas, but the beneﬁts of those were soon spread to the
entire world. Training was more important, since it taught people to decode
technical information and thus facilitated their learning in the arena where
most of the training took place, which was of course on the job. Drilling and
social conditioning may have been more important than either one of those,
since they directly aﬀected the absorption of tacit knowledge. In the end,
they may have had the largest impact on productivity. Even Amsden does
not explicitly make this point, yet the existence of a motivated, disciplined,
and punctual labor force may be one of those bridges between culture and
measurable productivity that does not collapse the moment you set foot 
on it.
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knowledge to operate and maintain equipment does not move freely and
eﬀortlessly across boundaries, even if the capital goods themselves do.
There is a deep diﬀerence between the knowledge needed to invent or de-
sign a new machine and the knowledge required to build it on a routine ba-
sis. These are in turn diﬀerent from operating and maintaining it. Thus
there is a very diﬀerent knowledge base required to design a bicycle, to re-
pair one, and to ride one. To actually carry out a technique, a ﬁrm needs
something we might call “competence” to set it apart from the concept of
“knowledge,” which is used to invent or design a technique. This compe-
tence, the literature in management science tells us, is neither free nor uni-
formly distributed.
Clark and Feenstra do not have much time for the notion that institutions
had an important impact on the outcome of this game. In the Clark-
Feenstra world, law and order rule, property rights are enforced, contracts
are honored, and governments do nothing at best. Eventually, however,
economists will come around to recognizing that institutions do more than
just that: They actually help determine the motivation and loyalty of work-
ers, the honesty of managers and bureaucrats, the reliability of consultants
and experts, and the willingness of the labor force to submit itself to what-
ever it takes to get to the productivity levels attained elsewhere. An inter-
esting attempt in this direction was provided recently by Parente and
Prescott (2000).
Without considering institutions, Clark and Feenstra’s paper faces a
deep problem. After all, Mexican or Indian workers migrating to high-
productivity economies do not bring their factor C with them. They leave it
behind at home. That suggests that it is neither cultural nor racial, but
something deeply embedded in the societies whence they come. That, per-
haps, is what we mean by institutions.
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